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PUBLIC LAW
proceeding would presumably then lie without violating the
exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Commission. 64
DISCHARGES IN BANKRUPTCY
Melvin G. Dakin*
During last term, in Louisiana Machinery Co. v. Passman,'
the Third Circuit took the opportunity to reaffirm the jurispru-
dence on the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy on a duly sched-
uled claim on which suit had been brought and default judgment
taken after discharge. The litigation arose some ten years after
adjudication, in a suit to revive a judgment.2 The court quoted
approvingly that "the effect of the discharge on a judgment
against the bankrupt based on a provable claim is the same as
its effect on the claim itself ... the discharge will bar personal
enforcement of the judgment against the bankrupt, or against
any property of the bankrupt on which it was not a lien . . .
the reduction of such liability to a judgment does not change its
nature or character." 3
Here, since the original judgment could not be enforced
against the bankrupt, it followed that such a judgment, revived,
could not be enforced either.4 The fact that bankrupt permitted
the suit to go to judgment against him did not defeat his right
to interpose his discharge whenever the judgment was sought to
be enforced, whether immediately or ten years thereafter, as
in the instant suit.5
In Robinson v. Henderson,6 a bankrupt persuaded an asso-
ciate to sign a note with him as an accommodation maker. After
several payments on the note by the bankrupt, he filed a volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy but did not schedule the note as a
debt for which he was seeking discharge. In due course, a dis-
charge was granted to bankrupt, his assets were sold, the pro-
64. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term -
Administrative Law, 19 LA. L. REv. 351, 352-53 (1959).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 158 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
2. Pursuant to LA. CODE OF Civir, PROCEDURE art. 2031 (1960).
3. 8B C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 563 (1963).
4. 158 So. 2d at 422.
5. Id. at 421.
6. 162 So. 2d 116 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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ceeds distributed, and the proceedings were terminated. There-
after, demand was made upon the co-signer of the note and hav-
ing paid, he brought suit against the bankrupt.
Section 17(a) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act provides for the
discharge of all provable debts except, among other categories,
those which "have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and
allowance. ' 7 Such provision has as its obvious purpose assur-
ance that the bankrupt has afforded his creditor an opportunity
to share in the distribution of his assets on pain of being denied
the protection of the discharge. However, the provision also has
an additional clause which would release the debtor if, despite
the failure to schedule the debt, "such creditor had notice or
actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy [in time for
proof and allowance]. '"
It has been suggested that such actual notice should not be
regarded as timely if it does not come about, not only in time to
permit sharing in dividends, but also in time to marshal any
reasons the creditor may have in opposition to the discharge.9
Here, the co-signer could hardly have failed to know about the
bankruptcy proceedings since part of the bankrupt's assets were
stored in the co-signer's warehouse and conversations ensued
about how the rent was to be paid on the warehouse, presumably
during the proceedings. Furthermore, the payee of the note had
been informed that "although... [the bankrupt] had not sched-
uled the note he intended to pay it" and payee testified that "he
wasn't much concerned about it, in any event, because he had a
solvent accommodation endorser."' 1 Perhaps the crux of the
matter is that the co-signer somehow did not realize that his ac-
commodation liability would continue despite the bankruptcy
proceeding; he testified that he was not particularly concerned
about "all of this vague information about the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding" because "he as an accommodation endorser had not yet
been called on to pay the note and he did not understand that
he would ever have to ,pay it."'  It seems quite unlikely that,
had he been aware of his liability, he would have been so uncon-
cerned about the proceeding, which he must have known was
going on. Perhaps, rather than the relatively weak factual basis
7. 74 Stat. 409, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (3) (Supp. 1963).
8. Ibid.
9. 162 So. 2d at 119, citing 8 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3358 (1955).
10. 162 So. 2d at 117.
11. Id. at 117, 118.
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used by the court to save the debt, that the evidence "does not
with sufficient certainty show the time such knowledge was
acquired," there may have been other possible grounds for what
seems a good result. One such possibility would be to interpret
"actual knowledge" of bankruptcy as equivalent to "due sched-
uling of a claim" only where the failure to schedule was inad-
vertent. Such an interpretation might plausibly be within the
legislative intent.12 Here, it seems likely that the failure to
schedule was a deliberate act on the part of the bankrupt. 13
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal again had before it a
number of cases involving the issue of whether or not a small
loan company debt had survived a bankruptcy proceeding be-
cause the loan or loan renewal had been obtained by fraud. In
two of these cases, the appeals court was satisfied, as found by
the trial court, that the requisites of section 17(a) (2) of the
bankruptcy act had been satisfied and affirmed. 1 4 In CHF Fi-
nance Co. v. Smith,3 the requirement of a co-signer was again
appraised and the rule of CHF Finance Co. v. Corca1 6 reexam-
ined. In Corca, it was held that the naked requirement of a co-
signer did not by itself negate the possibility of reliance on the
borrower's false financial statement, executed after bankrupt
"had been informed of the co-signer requirement." Since the evi-
dence showed a partial reliance on the false statement, this was
deemed to save the debt from discharge. 7 Here in Smith, how-
ever, the loan had been refused on the basis of the allegedly false
statement and a co-signer required; in view of other resources
also checked by lender, it was hinted that lender might even be
estopped to complain of misrepresentation. 8 In any event, the
court found the lender's testimony insufficient to show the reli-
ance and misleading necessary for recovery. 19
The 1960 amendment to section 17(a) (2)20 of the bank-
ruptcy act provided a happy ending for the lender in Liberal Fi-
12. But see Bucci v. La Rocca, 21 N.J. Misc. 316, 325-26, 33 A.2d 878, 882-83
(1943).
13. 162 So. 2d at 117.
14. Excel Finance Mid City, Inc. v. Chetta, 160 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964) ; United Credit Plan, Inc. v. Seminary, 162 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
15. 158 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
16. 152 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
17. Id. at 832.
18. 158 So. 2d at 273-74, noting from Excel Finance Mid City, Inc. v. Meil-
ikur, 137 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
19. Ibid.
20. 74 Stat. 409, 11 U.S.C.A. §35(a) (2) (Supp. 1963).
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nance Corp. v. Holley,2 1 involving proven false representation in
obtaining a loan. It was initially decided by the court that that
portion of a loan representing a renewal could not be saved from
discharge since no fraud was involved in obtaining it. 22 The pre-
sumption was also indulged that the payments made by the bank-
rupt were intended to be applied on the new debt since, knowing
it would survive, he would have the most interest in reducing
it.23 However, on rehearing, the court's attention was called to
the 1960 amendment,2 4 which saves from discharge not only the
original debt incident to obtaining money or property by false
representation, but also any extension or renewal of such debt
where there was reliance on a false representation in making
such extension or renewal. 25 Such reliance was found present




In Morehouse Natural Gas Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Comm'n, the Louisiana Supreme Court has presumably sup-
plied the definitive solution to a problem case which has been
shuttling between Commission, District Court, and Supreme
Court for some three and a half years. The case is the relatively
unusual one of a profitable gas distribution property sold to
another gas distribution company by a carbon black company,
not in compliance with any order of a regulatory commission
to which it was subject, but in order to avoid becoming subject
to such regulatory authority. 2 The company was willing to sell
the property for a fraction of its alleged depreciated original
cost to accomplish this result and thus to lay the groundwork
for a handsome return to the purchasers if the rates could be
21. 157 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
22. In Guedry Finance Co. v. McCubbin, 120 So. 2d 298 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1960), the renewal of an unmatured note was held not to involve property. See
cases collected in Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 645 (1961).
23. 157 So. 2d at 379, citing LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2166 (1870).
24. Commented upon in 21 LA. L. REV. 638 (1961).
25. 157 So. 2d at 379-80.
26. Id. at 378.
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1. 245 La. 983, 162 So. 2d 334 (1964).
2. Id. at 986, 162 So. 2d at 335.
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